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Abstract - Many rights, most especially of the second and third 
generations, are taken as human rights because they 
constitute a prerequisite to secure recognized other human 
rights of previous generations.  Access to land falls typically 
under this category and can therefore be regarded among 
these rights. Indeed, access to land is a precondition for an 
equal access to food and housing; as an item of cultural 
liberty, especially critical for indigenous peoples; and as a 
requirement for gender equality, for instance. Securing access 
to land often means transferring land rights, in other words 
reforming the agrarian structure. Land reform, thus, ends up 
being converted into an instrument to secure human rights. 
As usually in human rights discourse, responsibility is a key 
issue. In other words, one must determine what institution 
should conduct land reform. This essay tries to show that 
despite the fact that markets have somewhat been claiming 
for a more active intervention, the state is yet the most eligible 
institution to do it.  
Keywords - Human Rights, Land Reform, Development, State, 
Markets 
1.  Introduction  
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
states in its Article 3 the unalienable right to life; a life 
which other articles take to be more than just plain survival, 
demanding that it should meet the minimum standards of 
human dignity and that it should be enjoyed with freedom 
and safety. This right to life demands access to both the 
natural resources and the manufactured goods that are 
considered to be indispensable to life according to the 
requirements described above. Natural resources that fall 
into this category should, then, be considered as some sort 
of common capital for human existence (see Petrella 2004). 
Land in almost all of its uses, should probably be one the 
first of these resources to be listed among common capital 
items. A human rights-based approach to both its 
exploitation and its distribution seems, therefore, quite 
pertinent. 
 According to the United Nations Organization (UN), a 
human rights-based approach is a conceptual framework 
that is normatively based on international human rights 
standards and operationally directed to promoting and 
protecting them. A human rights-based approach to 
development, for example, integrates the norms, standards 
and principles of the international human rights system into 
the plans, policies and processes of development (HCHR 
2014). These standards can be found chiefly within the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and in what have 
been called the seven core treaties, of which the most 
relevant for our purpose are the two binding Covenants, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The scope of these 
rights range from the fulfilment of material aspirations, 
such as the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for themselves and their family, to the enjoyment of 
immaterial amenities such as freedom of speech or of 
religion. 
 Claims for a right to land have emerged from the 
recognition that access to land is a precondition for an equal 
access to food and housing; for the enjoyment of cultural 
liberty, especially critical for indigenous peoples; and a 
requirement for gender equality (Gilbert 2013: 117). 
Indeed, land is vital to produce food and other goods 
necessary to satisfy vital human needs such as shelter and 
clothing. Without access to land many people find 
themselves in a situation of great economic insecurity 
(Gilbert 2013: 115). Land is also critical to satisfy a wide 
range of cultural needs such as the performance of religious 
rites or the plain enjoyment of leisure without which 
peoples have argued that their culture may disappear and 
themselves prevented from enjoying their cultural liberty, 
in other words from leading the lives they value (see UNDP 
2004). 
2.  The Human Right to Land 
Prevailing international human rights law does not 
recognise a human right to land as such: no treaty affirms 
such a right in general terms (Cotula 2014: 17). This being 
said the necessity of providing access to land in order to 
secure the realization of human rights has been considered 
in several international principles and interpretive 
documents (Wickeri
 
and Kalhan 2010: 18). In many 
proclamations, human rights have been considered as such 
on the basis of a substantive implication of the 
implementation of other human rights. 
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 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) proclaimed in November 2002 
the Right to Water, for example, as a substantive 
implication of the implementation of the ICESCR, 
resulting from an extensive interpretation of its articles 11 
and 12. The human right to social security, listed in both 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the ICESCR rests precisely on this argument. Indeed, 
social security is considered a human right because it 
constitutes a prerequisite to the realisation of other rights 
such as the right to health, the right to an adequate standard 
of living or the right to the protection of motherhood 
(CESCR 2006), all concurring to the assertion of the most 
important of all rights, the right to life.  
 Admittedly numerous economic, social and cultural 
rights in the UDHR and the ICESCR are intimately 
connected to access to land, such as the rights to housing, 
food, health, and work, as accessing land constitutes a 
prerequisite to the realisation of these rights. In the 
ICESCR, articles 1, 6, and 11 are particularly concerned. 
 Article 1 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources (...). 
In no case may a people be deprived of its own 
means of subsistence. 
Article 6 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right to work, which includes the 
right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his 
living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, 
and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this 
right. 
Article 11 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions (ICESCR 1966) 
 The right to adequate housing is particularly relevant 
here, land being a critical element in securing this right. 
Indeed, land is often a necessary and sufficient condition 
on which the right to adequate housing is absolutely 
contingent for many individuals and even entire 
communities (OHCHR 2005: 41).
 
Despite recognizing the 
fact that the roots of the problem of hunger and 
malnutrition are not lack of food but lack of access to 
available food, the special rapporteur on the right to food 
also believes that access to land is a key element, necessary 
for eradicating hunger in the world,
 
and notes that many 
rural people suffer from hunger because either they are 
landless, they do not hold secure tenure or their properties 
are so small that they cannot grow enough food to feed 
themselves (OHCHR 2002: 22-23).
 
 Rights to land have also been developed in two key areas 
of international human rights law, the rights of indigenous 
people and the rights of women. Land access and use is 
frequently tied to the spiritual, cultural and social identities 
of peoples. The ICESCR in its article 15 proclaims that the 
States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to take part in cultural life. The Convention 169 
on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which was adopted by 
the International Labour Organization in 1989 also refer to 
a right to land in order to preserve cultural values.  
 Article 13 of this convention requires governments to 
respect the special importance to the cultures and spiritual 
values of indigenous and tribal peoples of their relationship 
with the lands or territories that they occupy; and Article 
14 establishes that ratifying States shall recognize the 
rights of ownership and possession of the peoples 
concerned over the lands that they traditionally occupy, and 
that States shall establish adequate procedures within the 
national legal system to resolve land claims brought by 
indigenous and tribal peoples. 
 The connection between cultural rights and land rights 
has again been acknowledged by the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) in its interpretation of article 27 of the 
ICCPR (ICCPR 1966), which concerns cultural rights for 
minorities. Article 27 does not refer to land rights per se, 
but emphasizes the connection between cultural rights and 
land rights. In the general comment on article 27 the HRC 
recognizes that for indigenous communities, a particular 
way of life is associated with the use of their lands stating 
that:  
 With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights 
protected under article 27, the Committee 
observes that culture manifests itself in many 
forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources 
(OHCHR 1994)  
 In East-Timor, for example, the tarabandu or sacred 
land, which imposes a wide set of restrictions to the use of 
land, is a fundamental feature of the national culture and 
therefore of the people's way of life and of the nation's 
identity (Henriques et al 2014). People's control of the 
access to that part of the country's land that is considered 
sacred is thus a fundamental requirement for enjoying 
cultural freedom in East Timor, which among other 
restrictions raises the question of the practicality of private 
ownership of land. 
 The right to land can also be invoked in relation to 
women’s rights. The Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its 




article 14, for example, requires that State Parties shall 
ensure that women have access to agricultural credit and 
loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and 
equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in 
land resettlement schemes (CEDAW 1979). Curiously 
enough, this article contains the only specific mention to 
land rights in the nine-core international human rights 
treaties (Gilbert 2013: 122). However, the main objective 
of the reference to land rights in this article is to ensure that 
women are not discriminated when land reforms occur. It 
does not constitute a claim for land reform or for a human 
right to land.   
 Although the ICCPR is particularly scant in direct 
references to land rights, there is an undeniable indirect 
connection between access to land and the exercise of 
democracy. In countries where agriculture is still the 
dominant economic sector, as frequently in many 
developing countries, land constitutes a major, and very 
unequally distributed, political resource. On the first hand, 
extremely unequal land distribution decisively contributes 
to the unequal distribution of income in rural areas and 
literature about the economic interactions with democracy, 
considers income inequality as an obstacle to 
democratization (see for example Acemoglu 2003; Barro 
1999; Engerman and Sokolof 2002; Fitoussi 2004; 
Przeworski et al 1996). On the other hand, extreme 
inequality within income distribution is a major source of 
political instability in rural areas, which can degenerate in 
violent conflicts that frequently overflow to urban areas, all 
of this being incompatible with the existence of democratic 
institutions (Gillis et al. 1992: 496; Barraclough 1999: 8). 
 Claims for land rights have also emerged as an issue of 
property rights. Both the 18th century US Bill of Rights and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen put the protection of property rights at the same 
level as the right to life (Gilbert 2013: 118). The UDHR in 
its turn states in article 17 that: 
 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone 
as well as in association with others.  
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property. (UDHR 1948) 
 Nevertheless, the reference to the right to property was 
abandoned in both the ICESCR and the ICCPR adopted in 
1966, making property rights one of the only human rights 
stated in the UDHR which was not incorporated into one 
of the legally binding Covenants. That is the main reason 
why this article shall not take the right to property into 
consideration despite the fact that property is arguably a 
central issue in access to land. 
3.  Human Rights Approach to Land  
Considering land as a human right requires us to adopt a 
specific approach to its use and transmission. This is all the 
more important as land has become increasingly 
commoditised, land grabbing being one of the most vivid 
examples of this global tendency. A human rights-based 
approach to land may provide an answer to this need, 
bringing an alternative perspective, where land is a social 
and cultural as much as an economic asset and, more 
importantly, a fundamental right. In practice a human 
rights-based approach is structured around four 
fundamental principles or groups of principles: 1) 
universality and indivisibility; 2); accountability and the 
rule of law 3); participation and empowerment, and 4); 
equality and non-discrimination. 
 Respect for the principles of universality and 
indivisibility imply that no one can be arbitrarily deprived 
of the enjoyment of human rights and that the value of each 
human right is intrinsically equal. Beyond the legitimate 
statutory exceptions, fundamental rights do not admit 
exclusion, in other words if rights are not guaranteed for 
all, then they belong to none. If a citizen is arbitrarily 
excluded from participating in an election, for example, 
this not only means that he or she is denied his or her right 
to vote but also that the right to vote is not ensured in the 
community to which he or she belongs, even if all except 
one are allowed to participate in the voting. Indivisibility 
of rights means that they cannot be ranked in a hierarchical 
order. If one can admit that, in practice, it is hard to avoid 
prioritizing them, that is to say achieving some rights 
before others when resources are scarce, one must agree 
that one part of the overall goal cannot be achieved in 
detriment of another (Branco 2009). 
 The second principle of a human rights-based approach 
to development is accountability and the rule of law. If one 
endorses human rights then one should also accept that 
each individual has some sort of credit with society 
concerning the provision of those goods and services that 
are needed to secure human rights. If there are not enough 
water or health services for everybody and therefore the 
individual’s right to these goods and services is not being 
secured he or she should be able to call for someone’s or 
some institution’s responsibility. Indeed, the right of an 
individual corresponds perforce to the duty of another or of 
the community at large and if the rights of an individual are 
not secured, this means that other individuals or institutions 
have failed in carrying out their duties (Branco and 
Henriques 2010). In human rights language, the exchange 
held between an individual and a provider is converted into 
a relationship between a rights-holder and a duty-bearer, 
accountability becoming, therefore, a critical issue.   
 The third principle, participation and empowerment, 
means not only that every person and all peoples are 
entitled to active, free, and meaningful participation in the 
process of designing and implementing development 
policies (DEZA 2007), but also that the outcome of these 
policies should strengthen the participation and the 




empowerment of these same persons and peoples in other 
levels of social life. In other words, development policies 
should also be expected to strengthen substantive 
democracy. By substantive democracy we mean a 
democracy which, besides elections, demands wide civil 
liberties, including freedom of association and expression; 
citizens to be deeply involved in the decisions on matters 
that affect them; and institutions to be strongly committed 
with responsibility and accountability in the running of 
public affairs; a democracy that not only aims at the interest 
of the governed but also at their meaningful participation 
in the process of decision-making (Branco 2012).   
 The fourth and last principle in our list concerns equality 
and non-discrimination. Human rights, if they are to be 
fully taken as rights, must be equally allocated among all 
those entitled to enjoy them within the community. Basic 
liberties, for instance, do not admit any allocation other 
than an egalitarian one (see Rawls 1972). Indeed, it is quite 
unacceptable for some individuals to deposit more votes in 
the ballot box than others. One need not be reminded that 
universal suffrage, as opposed to historical property or tax-
based electoral systems for example, confers one and only 
one vote to every citizen of voting age. 
 This does not imply that resources necessary to secure 
human rights must be equally distributed among people, 
but that everyone must have equal access to them. 
Otherwise, more than just deprivation we could be facing a 
violation of a human right. Equality and non-
discrimination mean first, that no one can be deprived of 
their human rights on the basis of ethnic, religious or 
political affiliation, or also gender and economic status, 
and, second, that everyone should evenly benefit from the 
minimum amount of that material provision considered 
fundamental to secure a given human right. 
 In the case of the human right to water and sanitation, 
recognized at the General Assembly of the United Nations 
through resolution 64/292 (UN 2010), for example, what is 
at stake is not that people should all benefit of the same 
amount of water but that everyone should have equal 
access to that minimum amount of water that is considered 
necessary to secure the human right to water. People 
should, then, have equal access to 50 to 100 liters of water 
per person per day to meet basic personal needs (OHCHR 
2011), not exactly to the amount needed to fill up a private 
pool or wash the family car in the driveway. 
What could one say about land along the same lines? When 
any material provision, such as land, is at stake in securing 
human rights there is indeed a quantitative as much as a 
qualitative dimension in its access and in order to secure 
this human right this issue must be addressed. However, it 
is not easy to determine the quantity and quality of the 
provision of land that secures this human right. First of all, 
it is not possible, contrary to water, to meet the non-
exclusion principle by distributing land to all individuals, 
not only because there is not enough land on the planet to 
award every human being the meaningful enjoyment of a 
stretch of land, but also because meeting the determinations 
at the origin of the right to land does not actually require 
such a degree of distribution. Furthermore, the right to land 
is an individual as much as a collective or group right and, 
therefore, distribution per se might not even be at stake. 
 The amount establishing the minimum provision of land 
to secure the human right to land is also not easy to 
determine. The minimum of both the quantity and the 
quality of land depend on myriad criteria such as soil 
characteristics, geographical location or cultural 
idiosyncrasies of the population concerned. It would, 
therefore, be pure speculation to say much more than just 
that this minimum should be such that it allows the tenants 
a dignified life, as stated in many economic and social 
rights.  
 Other aspects of land tenure, such as the right to exclude 
others, to plant and harvest crops, to sell or lease land, the 
length of time for which tenure rights are valid and 
assurance of these rights are quite relevant in securing a 
human right to land. However, they are as hard to 
circumscribe as quantity and quality and, likewise, will not 
be further developed. At this stage, therefore, more than 
determining why and how to implement the human right to 
land we must ask ourselves who should bear the 
responsibility to secure this same right. 
4.  Land Reform and Human Rights 
Acknowledging that the amount of land is limited on earth, 
one is forced to assume that securing a community or an 
individual his or her right to land may imply that some 
other community or individual will end up being deprived 
of this same right. Thereby, land reform becomes logically 
an instrument for securing human rights. However, some 
may sustain that by doing so the very essence of human 
rights is questioned, that efforts to acquire rights should not 
infringe on the individual rights of others, this being 
particularly relevant to the case of accessing land where 
land reform has often meant land redistribution (Tapscott 
2012: 31).  
 According to Hillel Steiner (1994) the only rational 
theory of human rights is the one that avoids conflict, 
namely with property. Land reform would therefore, be 
contradictory to human rights. This is not the opinion of 
Norberto Bobbio, though. He sustains, on the contrary, that 
one cannot always assert a new right in favour of a group 
of individuals without suppressing some old right in 
detriment of another group of individuals (Bobbio 1992: 
20). Actually, within the International Human Rights 
Legislation land reform is explicitly mentioned. The 
ICESCR, for example, recognizes the legitimacy of land 




reform for securing human rights in its article 11 when 
declaring that: 
 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to 
be free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, the measures, 
including specific programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food by making 
full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of 
nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems in such a way as to achieve the most 
efficient development and utilization of natural 
resources; 
 The FAO Voluntary Guidelines adopted in 2004 also 
recognizes land reform as an instrument for securing 
human rights when proclaiming that:  
States should consider establishing legal and other 
policy mechanisms, consistent with their 
international human rights obligations and in 
accordance with the rule of law, that advance land 
reform to enhance access for the poor and women 
(FAO 2004). 
 Several arguments can be put forward to substantiate the 
connection between land reform and human rights. We 
have already argued that land can be considered a human 
right as access to land is a prerequisite to the realization of 
other rights, as for example the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing. From this one can easily deduce that 
being land reform an instrument to secure access to land, 
land reform becomes thereby an instrument in securing 
human rights. A World Bank analysis of land policies in 73 
countries between 1960 and 2000, for example, sustains 
that, countries in which the distribution of land was initially 
more equal achieved economic growth rates two to three 
times higher than those in which land distribution was 
initially less equal (World Bank 2006). 
 Land reform is also an instrument to reduce poverty. A 
statistical analysis of comparable data on 21 developing 
countries shows that a decrease of one third in the land 
distribution inequality index results in a reduction in the 
poverty level of one half in about 12-14 years, whereas 
without changing land distribution inequality this same 
level of poverty reduction can only be obtained in 60 years 
(El-Ghonemy 2003/2: 40). Post Second World War land 
reforms in Asia, on the other hand, resulted in a 30 per cent 
increase in the incomes of the bottom 80 per cent of 
households (Penciakova 2010: 8). 
 Finally, land reform appears to be a decisive act towards 
democratization and the consolidation of democracy in 
many countries as, first, unequally distributed land 
constitutes an obstacle to democratization as we have seen 
above and, second, other things being equal, if a democratic 
government transfers property rights from a minority of 
privileged land owners to a majority or poorer farmers, this 
will understandably reinforce their adhesion to democracy 
and because the benefited will largely outnumber the 
impaired, this will in turn reinforce democracy's social 
basis.. 
 As we have already stressed, in the language of human 
rights the rights of individuals correspond to duties of other 
individuals, in other words human rights represent the 
rights that individuals have over the conduct of others. 
Therefore, if the rights of some individuals are not secured, 
this is due to the fact that other individuals or institutions 
have failed in carrying out their duties. In human rights 
language, responsibility is therefore a key issue. Who 
should conduct land reform as instrument to secure human 
rights, then? 
 In human rights literature in general, the right of an 
individual constitutes a duty of society, usually embodied 
by the state. Thus, wherever there is a right of an individual, 
there is a duty of the state to provide institutional protection 
to this right (Canotilho 1984; Bobbio 1992), even if in 
some cases, most particularly, concerning economic, social 
and cultural rights, there is no subjective right of the citizen 
in this respect (Queiroz 2002; Donnelly 2002). In recent 
years, though, putative state inefficiency has been set forth 
to argue that private actors should play a more active role 
in securing human rights, most especially economic and 
social rights. Can the responsibility model centred in the 
state be extended to non-state institutions obligations (see 
Hertel 2003), like markets? In other words, can an 
institution other than the state conduct land reform as an 
instrument for securing human rights?  
 State obligations as defined in the UDHR or the ICESCR 
only refer non-specifically to the duty to employ all 
relevant legal and policy measures in order to reach the full 
realization of human rights. In other words, several 
combinations of state and markets could theoretically be 
envisaged that admit some degree of private participation 
while still recognizing the predominant public character of 
securing human rights. Despite this recognition, the 
following pages will argue that markets are not fully 
prepared to play this role when land is concerned. First, 
markets do not voice social preferences and therefore do 
not observe universality and equality; second, they are not 
accountable and; third, they are ineffective.  
4.1. Markets do not Voice Social Preferences and 
are not Accountable 
First of all, when universal rights such as human rights are 
being promoted, one is asserting a social preference. In the 




case of a right to land one is therefore inclined to admit that 
a degree of land distribution may be better than another. 
Furthermore, if in this circumstance one cannot speak of 
universality in the sense that each individual should benefit 
from a stretch of land in order to secure the right to land, 
exclusion, as in the case of rural landlessness, could be 
unacceptable, as it could constitute a violation of a human 
right. It turns out that markets do not voice social 
preferences.  
 What matters for markets is that agents are satisfied, in 
other words that sellers are able to sell the amounts they 
wish at market prices and that buyers are able to buy what 
they seek at the same market prices. Markets speak the 
language of wants and within this language ability to pay 
is the key question. Within the language of rights, on the 
other hand, the issue is quite different; the heart of the 
matter here concerns entitlement, the criteria according to 
which an individual should be qualified to enjoy rights 
(purchasing power being obviously excluded) and the 
consequences of the use of such criteria.  
 If in the first case exclusion and inequality are tolerable, 
in the second case the only acceptable situation is the one 
characterized by inclusion and equality. In market led land 
reforms, not only inequalities in land distribution may not 
be addressed, but also, they can sometimes even lead to the 
reconcentration of land and, therefore, to greater inequality 
(UN 2010: 18). Indeed, the poorest farmers could easily be 
brought to sell land to large landowners and then "be priced 
out", particularly if they have fallen into debt as a result of 
a bad harvest or other circumstances declares Olivier de 
Schutter, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on the 
right to food (UN 2010: 11). 
 Because human rights represent the rights that 
individuals have over the conduct of others accountability 
as we have said above is a key issue. When the state, for 
example, fails in ensuring an individual his or her human 
rights, the state is accountable either legally in a court of 
law or politically through elections. If markets fail in 
securing human rights, whom should an individual turn to? 
The state is known; markets, on the contrary, are by 
definition anonymous.  
 Markets in a capitalist society are at the most indirectly 
accountable to corporations’ shareholders only (Ellerman 
2007: 16–17). According to corporate governance in a 
capitalist society decisions are not taken by all those 
affected by them, but by those who own the capital. 
Therefore, in a society where markets take most of the 
major economic decisions, controlling accountability 
becomes, at best, dependent on each shareholder’s 
financial weight; at worst, citizens will be governed by an 
unaccountable entity. In conclusion, markets are not only 
unequipped to secure the right to land in particular, but also 
to allocate rights in general (see Branco 2015).  
4.2.  Markets are not effective 
The agrarian structure, like so many other institutions is 
constantly changing. With land reform, the issue, then, is 
not so much about change versus immobility, but rather 
about the rhythms and modes of change. The rhythms are 
particularly important because despite the fact that the 
agrarian structure undergoes constant change, a very slow 
pace of change is often interpreted as immobility. Land 
reform, therefore, means fundamentally a sudden 
transformation of the agrarian structure, and often also a 
sudden change in property rights.  
 Changes within the agrarian structure that occur in the 
long period cannot be considered as land reform, thus. 
There is no undisputable standard to define what a long 
period of time is, but the temporal magnitude of land 
reform must exclude the transformation of agrarian 
structures that take place over several generations, through 
inheritance or commercial transaction. If markets can 
promote changes in the agrarian structures they cannot 
implement them as fast as necessary in order for them to be 
labeled land reform. 
 Compulsory transfer of property rights can only be 
performed by the state and if most commonly in land 
reform one deals with redistribution of property, state 
intervention can also be called upon to implement property 
rights where they were previously unknown, either because 
the land in question is located in agricultural frontiers or 
because collective property rights are dominant, as occurs 
with commons or with traditional land allocation for 
cultivation in many parts of Africa (see Demsetz, 1967). 
 In traditional economic theory, markets are supposed to 
transfer more effectively land to more productive uses and 
users. Nevertheless, land transactions tend to favour not 
those who can make the most efficient use of land, but 
those who have access to capital and greater ability to 
purchase land (Musembi 2008), which may be 
contradictory to the main purposes of land reform. 
Furthermore, with markets land can be taken out of 
cultivation for speculation, resulting in both decreased 
productivity and increased landlessness among the rural 
poor (UN 2010: 10-11). 
 By way of synthesis markets are not fully prepared to 
lead land reform because markets exclude politics, which 
should not be mistaken with the inability to express 
political interests, though. Land reform is a political act par 
excellence (Barraclough 1999: 1) and it is the state, by 
means of accountable governance that is best equipped for 
designing and implementing policy in order to secure 
human rights.  
 This doesn't mean that markets cannot have a role to play 
in a successful land reform. As pointed out by UN's Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, 




improving access to credit and markets, as well as rural 
extension, can account for 60 to 70 per cent of the total 
costs of a sustainable land reform (UN 2010: 18). 
According to the World Bank the failure of Latin American 
reforms when compared with Asian reforms should be 
attributed to the fact that Latin American reforms have 
traditionally focused solely on access to land, neglecting 
rural development policies (World Bank 2003:146). 
 In an open economy markets have forcibly a role to play 
in the implementation of these policies. Nevertheless, the 
state must make sure that market intervention is compatible 
with human rights, declares Olivier de Schutter. For this 
purpose, he holds that the state must regulate markets in 
order to, among other objectives, 1) prevent land 
speculation and land concentration; 2) secure gender 
equality and; 3) encourage communal ownership instead of 
individual titling whenever culturally and politically 
demanded (UN 2010: 21). 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Because access to land is very often a prerequisite to 
secure recognized human rights one can claim that land 
itself is a human right. As land is not available in infinite 
amounts around the world, securing access to land often 
means transferring land rights, in other words reforming 
the agrarian structure. Land reform is converted 
consequently into an instrument to secure human rights, not 
only the right to land but also other economic and social 
rights that fall under the more general umbrella of the right 
to development. The key issue becomes, then, what 
institution should be called upon to conduct land reform. 
This essay has tried to show that despite the fact that 
markets have somewhat been claiming for a more active 
intervention, the state is yet the most qualified institution 
not only to conduct land reform, but also to secure human 
rights in general.  
 But more than determining the nature of the provider, the 
crucial issue is defining the nature of the resource. Within 
the global economy natural resources, such as land, have 
been increasingly commoditized, and following this logic 
agrarian structural change has been occurring through 
commercial transactions. A human rights-based approach 
to land brings another perspective to the value of land, as 
an economic, social and cultural asset and, more 
importantly, a fundamental right. The necessary 
decommodification (see Branco and Henriques 2012) that 
ensues from this approach assigns the state the prime 
responsibility to conduct land reform. In an open economy 
markets can also be called upon to play a decisive part 
because rural development involves the whole of society, 
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